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Abstract 
 
This paper evaluates the Swedish school reform that was implemented in 1992, at 
upper secondary school level. The reform implies that independent schools are 
welcome to compete on the school market and are publicly funded. This reform has 
led to an increase in the share of students attending independent schools. Several 
estimations are performed in this paper on what impact this increase of competition 
has had on students average GPA in public schools. Students from social science and 
science programs are included. The tests are done with multiple linear regression 
models and instrumental variable regressions on data collected from 2010. This study 
covers 93 schools in social science and 76 schools in science programs from 46 
different municipalities spread over the country. Previous research has shown a 
variety of findings. In this paper, no significant results have shown that independent 
schools would raise the average GPA in public schools; municipalities with no 
independent schools perform as well as municipalities with a high share of 
competition. Control variables are used to check for school characteristics. Mainly, it 
is the number of female students and share of parents with higher education that have 
the greatest impact. To conclude, this study shows that grades will not be affected if a 
public school is exposed to competition or not. At the same time, there is no evidence 
proving that the quality worsens because of competition; that comes from concerns 
about segregation, where the good students end up in better independent schools and 
leave low performing students behind.     
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: school-choice reform, school competition, public education, educational 
achievement   
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the implementation of the Swedish school reform, there has been a remarkable 
growth of the number of independent schools on the school market. The idea behind 
introducing the reform was the idea that increased competition would lead to a higher 
quality of education, increased cost-efficiency and a more diversified school market 
with schools covering students’ needs and interests.  
 
The underlying argument for why privatization should affect the quality of the 
education is that a monopoly situation may create a lack of incentives for running a 
good and efficient school. In turn, when it is exposed to competition, schools may be 
forced to improve their quality. A competitive environment could also give space for 
new ideas, methods, pedagogy and increased efficiency of running a school. This 
could in turn also have spill over effects, which would affect the outcome for both 
public and independent schools.  
 
When evaluating previous research and literature, the evidence and findings on the 
effect of competition on the school market have varied. How competition has affected 
the quality of public schools has been tested in a range of different ways, both in 
Sweden and in other countries. Previous Swedish empirical studies have used several 
different approaches to measure independent schools impacts on the school market. 
There has been the subject: if competition has contributed to a higher form of grade 
inflation (Wikstrom and Wikstrom 2005), or if the free school reform has increased 
segregation among young people (Ahlin 2003; Böhlmark and Lindahl 2007). This 
study has a different focus; it will investigate how competition will affect the quality 
of public schools. The hypothesis builds on previous studies suggesting that 
competition will enhance the level of education and give incentives to public schools 
to improve their education. But instead of focusing on students in compulsory school, 
as in previous studies, this paper will use data on students from upper secondary 
school. To the author’s knowledge, this has never been done before and it is of 
interest because of the extensive share of students that go to independent schools in 
comparison to upper school level.   
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The central contribution of this paper is that I use a data set on upper secondary 
schools from municipalities spread all over Sweden to empirically analyse the effect 
that the Swedish school reform has had on the quality of education in upper secondary 
schools.      
1.1 Research Question 
 
The aim to this research is to analyse to what extent competition on the school market 
has affected average grades on public schools in the Swedish school market. The 
purpose of this paper is to contribute to the research on the Swedish educational 
system, concentrating on upper secondary school. This will be done by different 
empirical methods. To study the relationship between educational quality and 
competition is of the highest importance since there is a complete lack of empirical 
findings from upper secondary schools in Sweden. An empirical analysis of 
competition of upper secondary school is necessary since it is a field of unclear 
theoretical predictions. Because of the extensive school reform Sweden implemented, 
it is necessary to evaluate its effect on the school market. 
 
The research question is following: 
 
To what extent has competition on the school market affect the average GPA on 
upper secondary school level?  
1.2 Methods and Data 
 
In this study, the empirical testing is based on two different quantitative, econometric 
methods applied to test whether an increase of the share of students that go to 
independent upper secondary schools in a municipality will have a positive effect on 
average school grades in public schools. A number of multiple linear regressions and 
IV-regressions are performed to assess the determinants of average grades. School-
level data is collected from the database SIRIS, provided by the Swedish national 
agency for education from the year 2010. Data on the municipality level such as 
educational level, average income, if there is a conservative majority etc. is collected 
from Statistics Sweden. The study started with using the 50 largest municipalities in 
Sweden, but, because of missing data, it ended up with 46 municipalities spread out 
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over the country. Because of the selection of data, the result will be tested for 
robustness.    
 
1.3 Limitations 
 
The main limitation of this paper is due to the lack of good data. Primarily, there is 
the limitation of finding accurate data on how to measure knowledge among the 
students. First of all, there are no tests that can be considered to measure something as 
general as knowledge. The closest one can find today would be the national test, 
which is performed both in compulsory school and upper secondary school. 
Unfortunately, the results on these tests are not available for all schools on upper 
secondary school level, and the sample of schools differs from year to year. Another 
issue is that the teachers from the same school usually correct the national tests; this 
creates problems with objectivity Due to the lack of good measurements, average 
GPA is used in this paper. The measurement still suffers from subjectivity, since the 
teachers set the grades, but it is the only available data, it covers almost every school 
in Sweden and is therefore very useful. Another limitation is that the data set only 
consists of aggregated data. With individual data, a more sophisticated method could 
have been performed, such as value added specification (Ahlin 2003), but to my 
knowledge, research has never been done on this level and therefore it is important to 
fill that gap with the existing data.   
 
1.4 Outline 
In the following section, chapter 2, the Swedish school market is shortly explained, 
with some background information of why Sweden implemented the school reform 
and how it is designed. In chapter 3, the focus changes to the theoretical framework. 
Some background on theory of inefficient bureaucracy will be explained and 
questions such as why competition would improve education will be examined. 
Findings in previous studies will also be presented. Chapter 4 includes the 
methodology and the data set. A discussion about the different variables and why they 
are selected will be presented. There will also be an explanation of the equations used. 
In chapter 5, the results will be reported. It contains the descriptive statistics, the 
findings from the OLS and the IV-estimations. This section is completed with a 
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robustness test. The final chapter of this paper will be a conclusion and some 
suggestions for future research.    
2. The Swedish case 	  
In the early 1990s, Sweden implemented school reforms, changing the outlook of the 
Swedish school system. Prior to 1991, school funding and decision-making was 
centralised, but with the new reforms, there was a shift of responsibility from the state 
to the municipality level. There were three major changes, covering both compulsory 
school and upper secondary school. The largest difference, and the reason to this 
paper, was the deregulation of the school market. After 1992, it became possible for 
independent schools to enter the school market and independent schools were from 
that time onwards treated as equal to public schools. Before this period, the only 
existing private schools were boarding schools and a few international schools. After 
1992, there has been a remarkable increase of independent schools, which will also be 
shown later.  
 
Besides for this paradigm shift, there was also a transfer of responsibility from the 
state to the municipality, with a focus on funding and control. From that point 
onward, the municipality had to provide a financial voucher per student for 
independent schools. The voucher is based on the average expenditure per student in 
public schools and given for each student deciding to enrol in an independent school. 
This reform changed the financial terms of independent schools and put them on more 
equal, financial footing as public schools (Ahlin 2003). 
 
Thirdly, it was now possible for the students to chose which school they wanted to 
attend within the municipality border. The main criterion is that compulsory schools 
are open for all. The reform had limited impact on compulsory schools since it is 
subject to availability, students living close to a school are prioritized, and a change of 
school is only available if there are free spots. In comparison to other countries, 
independent schools in Sweden cannot reject students for ability, religion or ethnic 
origin (Sandström, Bergström et al. 2002). According to the school act, independent 
and public schools need to apply the same rules for selecting students. For upper 
secondary schools, it is only grades from ninth grade that students are applying with. 
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For a private actor to operate on the school market and become accepted to take part 
of the voucher scheme, they have to be approved by the Swedish National Agency for 
Education. It is also the NAE that is responsible for checking that the independent 
schools comply with the regulations. It is only the NAE who has the power to make a 
decision in this question. While the municipality has no formal authority to reject an 
establishment of independent schools, they do have the right to give the NAE their 
opinion if they believe an entrance on the school market might harm the quality of 
public school (Sandström, Bergström et al. 2002).  
 
Except for a few schools (boarding schools, special pedagogy schools, international 
schools etc.), independent schools are only allowed to get funded by school vouchers. 
They are not allowed to take any additional tuition fees from their students. Because 
of the prohibition of tuition fees, an independent schools financial opportunity 
depends on the school policy of the municipality and on how costly students are in the 
municipality. Therefore, social characteristics of a municipality may determine the 
existence of independent schools. There are also no restrictions for ownership 
structures for independent schools; non-profit organisations or for-profit corporations 
are all accepted, so it is relatively easy to enter the education market in Sweden 
(Sahlgren 2010).  
  
The presence of independent schools has changed the Swedish school market in the 
last twenty years. Sweden has had a rapid growth of independent schools, especially 
at the upper secondary school level. The main aim of introducing the school reform 
was to improve the quality of Swedish education through competition. Sweden has 
chosen to fund it differently compared to other countries. Unlike other countries with 
open school markets, Sweden introduced the most completed and extensive reform 
with full governmental funding. Sweden became one of the most decentralized school 
systems in the developed world (Lundahl 2002). 
 
There are several reasons why the Swedish case is of interest. First of all, the Swedish 
government does not make any difference between schools when doling out financial 
funding to public and independent schools. As long as the school fulfils the needed 
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requirements, a wide range of different ownerships, both non-profit and profit 
organisations are receiving the same amount of funding. Different kinds of 
ownerships have led to an extensive debate about whether private firms should be 
able to make profits from its operations funded by tax money, a reform only existing 
in Sweden.  
 
Unlike many other countries, independent schools in Sweden do not aim for a certain 
specific group of students to their school. In comparison to the USA where a major 
share of independent schools are of religious character, and therefore Swedish 
independent schools compete for the same students as public schools.  
 
Figure 1. Students in independent schools 
	  
Source: The Swedish National Agency for Education 2012 
 
The enrolment of independent schools differs between municipalities, but it has had a 
rapid growth since the implementation, as you can see in the graph above. Before the 
reform, there were only a few independent schools in Sweden. The graph shows the 
increase of the role independent schools have had in upper secondary schools after the 
voucher reform. Today, the share of independent schools is over 20 percent. There 
has also been a major change for compulsory schools but not to the same extent as 
upper secondary school. In 2010, about 10 percent of all the students on compulsory 
school level, attended independent schools.      
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By correlating the vouchers a school receives to the number of students attending the 
school, it creates a mechanism between schools popularity and how much funding it 
gets.  
3. Theoretical framework 
3.1 Cost efficiency and public choice  
 
When Sweden implemented its new school reform, Sweden had recently gone 
through a financial crisis and the economic situation was not up to the prosperous 
level Sweden had experienced in the 1980’s. One of the reasons for the reform was to 
run the schools more efficiently than before (Lundahl 2002).  
 
The economic theories of education derive from economic models of production 
theory and firm behaviour. One of the main areas in production theory, economic 
efficiency, has a much more vague connection to public schools than regular firms. 
This question became relevant according to Duncombe, Miner et al. (1997) when they 
showed evidence of declining student performance, despite an increase of spending 
on schools and students. Hanushek (1986) was one of the first to investigate how 
efficient public schools are operated. According to him, production theory is what you 
need to be studying, to understand the conceptual model of the educational processes 
and to understand the findings of educational economics. 
 
Duncombe, Miner et al. (1997) analysed the inefficiency of bureaucratic models, with 
an emphasis on education. The perception that public school bureaucracy does not 
serve student’s interest, but the administration, is one of the problems that have given 
the attention to the school vouchers programmes and a competitive market. They are 
guiding us through public choice models and how those causes inefficiency.  One of 
the major differences of executing production analysis between public and private 
sector derives from the political process, which controls the allocation of public 
resources. To make a decision in the public sector is more time consuming and it 
suffers from several principal-agent situations, from voters, politicians and 
bureaucrats.  Niskanen (1975) develops his theory about public choice theory, and the 
objectives of public managers. He claims that decision makers have the incentive to 
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maximise the difference between total revenue received and the least cost of 
production. The excess of expenditures that occur will then be used for non-
productive activities, which in turn will generate utility to the bureaucrat. This 
reasoning has similarities to perfect price-discrimination and will lead to a cost 
inefficient provision.  
 
Below, an analytic framework is provided, created by Wyckoff (1990), to explain the 
slack maximizing model, that goes in line with Niskanen’s theory. Point A in figure 1 
represents the median voter’s optimal mix of public goods (S) and private goods (Z), 
given the budget constraint. According to Wyckoff, the decisive voter has a reversion 
utility level (!!), which is a limit for the voter, below this line the voter will either 
vote against the proposition or leave the community. Hence, the maximizing 
bureaucrat will try to end up at point B, where the amount of public goods is 
maximized. The slack-maximizing bureaucrat would instead strive for under-
providing public services and select the quantity of public goods so that the gap 
between the exogenous level of utility !!and the budget constraint is as large as 
possible, point C. The two different models explained in this model draw different 
solutions. While the budget-maximizing bureaucrat will over-provide public services 
in a cost efficient way, the slack-maximizing bureaucrat will be both allocative 
inefficient, since it under-provides services, and be cost inefficient.  
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Figure 2. Bureaucratic inefficiency 
	  
Source: Duncombe, Miner et al. (1997) “Figure 1” 
 
Through the framework explained by Wyckoff and what Niskanen estimated, models 
are evolved to help understand why a public school system, similar to the Swedish 
system pre-1992, can be perceived as economically inefficient.    
 
3.2 Competition and quality  
 
The theoretical argument for school choice and competition in the school market is 
that freedom of choice will lead to an enhanced match between what students need 
and what is offered and an increased parental choice. It also tells us that competition 
will result in better quality and a more efficient usage of resources. According to 
Hoxby (2000), school choice generates incentives that schools have to be more 
productive because it gives households more information on the principal-agent 
problem existing between the parents and the people running the school, and schools 
need to provide good education in order to not be rejected. Though it will most likely 
take years before any effects can be traced to a school reform like the one in Sweden. 
It can be misleading to focus on short-term effects because they depend solely on 
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students actively making a decision after the implementation of the reform. The effect 
of competition where unsuccessful schools actually exit and more successful schools 
expand, may take years. The modern case for using vouchers and how an increase in 
educational choice creates a better school started with Friedman (1955).  
 
Eberts et al. (1990) stated:  
“increased freedom by parents and students to choose the school that best meets their 
educational needs would in this view, not only provide a better match of supply and 
demand, but would also discipline teachers and administrators to be more responsive 
to the needs of students and thus provide a more efficient and effective educational 
program”.   
 
3.3 Empirical research on public schools  
 
Over the years public schools have been accused of not offering a sufficient 
education. There have been a number of different researchers arguing that 
independent schools create spill-over effects on public schools and increase the 
educational quality both in independent and public schools (Friedman 1955; Friedman 
and Friedman 1981). This can be seen as a result of that the worst schools will go out 
of business.  
 
There have been several American researchers looking for evidence of school choice 
improving the quality of education (Borland and Howsen 1992). Hoxby (1994) 
examined the mechanism between increased competition and quality of education. 
She studied the effects of inter-school competition on public schools by using 
exogenous variation in the availability and costs of private school alternatives to 
public schools. She found that greater competitiveness significantly improves the 
quality of public schools, measured by educational attainment, graduation rates and 
teacher wages.   
 
Dee (1998) went one step further and examined how competition affected the quality 
of public schools in 18 different states in America. Dee realized that empirical 
strategies which rely exclusively on ordinary least-squares (OLS) could result in 
misleading findings because of omitted variable bias. A central empirical issue has 
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been that the key variable, number of students attending private schools, may have 
been endogenously determined. Dee states that there is evidence that the equilibrium 
demand for private schools is significantly affected by several dimensions of 
socioeconomic status. Those socioeconomic characteristics also correlate with the 
level of student achievement. If the empirical model does not account for the 
socioeconomic priors of students and their communities, a partial correlation between 
competition and the quality of public schools could create misleading inferences.  
 
A second specification issue Dee was concerned about was that the demand for 
private schools is not an independent determinant of the quality of local public 
schools. Several researchers have drawn the conclusion that an increase of the quality 
of public schools should reduce the demand for private schools (Downes and 
Greenstein 1996). According to Dee, the existence of omitted variable bias might 
underestimate the effect of competition from private schools on public school 
achievements. Therefore, Dee performed a method with two-stage least-square 
regressions, and found that competition from private schools does have a positive 
impact on high-school graduation rates. As a measurement for competition and 
popularity for private schools, Dee used population concentration of Catholics. This is 
one way to deal with the endogeneity problem that could have occurred. In the USA, 
a large proportion of private school enrolment is in catholic schools, and, therefore, 
the population concentration of Catholics and private schools is highly correlated.  
 
When Hoxby performed her experiment about competition and the quality of public 
schools, she also used religious concentration as an instrument for measuring the 
existence of private schools. Back in 1994, religious private schools accounted for 
87% of the U.S. private enrolment, and Catholic schools alone accounted for 80% of 
private school enrolment. Using religion as an exogenous measure for competition to 
public school is relevant because of its correlation with private schools, but is 
uncorrelated with other factors affecting the demand for private schools, such as 
public schools with poor quality. Hoxby also found evidence that greater private 
school competition raises the quality of public schools measured in wages, high 
school graduation rates and educational attainment.   
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There are other researchers investigating the interrelationship between independent 
and public schools as a consequence of a new voucher system (Epple and Romano 
1998). There have not always been unanimous results in this question. Sander (1999) 
found that there were no improvement of the quality in the public school sector  in the 
districts of Illinois, but at the same time he could not prove that there would be a 
decrease in the quality either. Borland and Howsen (1992) expected that increased 
concentration on the market and competition between the students and the voucher 
that comes with it, should improve the quality. However, according to their findings, 
competition has led to decreases in student achievement.  
 
In Sweden, Sandström, Bergström et al. (2002) provided one of the first studies in the 
field by doing an empirical analyses on what impacts the Swedish school reform has 
had on public schools. They used a data set of 28 000 students in ninth grade from 
both public and independent schools in the scholastic year 1997/98. In this case, it 
also suffered from identification problems that the student demand for private schools 
is related to the quality of public schools and the students that choose independent 
schools are not a random sample but can be calculated with background variables. 
Instead of using two staged least square regression, Sandström, Bergström et al. 
(2002) chose to approach it differently. They used sample selection models to 
simultaneously model student’s choice of schools and their educational achievements. 
An attempt to estimate the share of students attending independent schools was also 
performed. Instead of using variables such as religion as an instrument, they used a 
number of political variables to create an instrument. With help of interviews with 
representatives from the four largest Swedish school corporations, Böhlmark and 
Lindahl (2008) concluded that municipal characteristics are important when opening 
up a new school. They found that it is mainly the attitudes towards privatization 
among local politicians and voters that matter. According to them, local authorities 
have the power to limit the expansion of independent schools if they have a hostile 
attitude towards them. Except for the political variables, some characteristics of the 
municipality were also used such as, if it belongs to an urban area, the average income 
etc.  
 
Sandström and Bergström used five different measurements of educational 
achievement as dependent variable in their models. This is a consequence of the 
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difficulties in measuring educational achievements. The first one used was a student’s 
credit value, which is calculated from the student’s final grades and is used for 
applying to high school. This measurement is lacking in objectivity since it may give 
teachers incentives to give higher grades to attract students. Therefore, two sub-tests 
from the achievement test in mathematics are used to limit the subjectivity. The two 
last variables are used for other reasons. There has been concern that competition will 
increase the average performance but at the same time hurt the low-ability students. 
So the first variable used, therefore, measures if the student passed the three cardinal 
subjects: mathematics, Swedish and English. The second measures if the student has 
passed in all subjects. Their results confirmed what Dee and Hoxby found in their 
papers: that competition will improve the results in public schools. Both the higher 
test results and grades are significant in statistical terms.  
 
Ahlin (2003) performed a similar study with two research questions. The first one was 
if a higher degree of school competition improves student performance, and the 
second was if higher-performing students gain at the expense of more disadvantaged 
students, one of the main objections to school choice. It has been argued that students 
who actively are making a decision of which school they want to enrol, also tend to be 
more motivated students or have parents that are more engaged in their children’s 
education. Low-achieving students will then be left behind in schools with lower 
education quality and cannot compete about the other students. This also means that 
low-achieving students will end up in classes with lower performing peer groups. 
Ahlin did not find uniform evidence that competition has enhanced the performance 
on English and Swedish tests, but at the same time it did not show that competition 
has had a negative effect on the results. Böhlmark and Lindahl (2008) also found  
varying results with positive effects on short-term outcomes but no effect in the long-
run.  
 
Criticism has arisen towards papers studying this mechanism. Newmark (1995) re-
specified the model used by Couch, Shughart Ii et al. (1993) and the relationship 
proving that the educational achievement in public schools is higher in the counties in 
the US where a larger share of the school-aged children were enrolling in private 
schools, was not statistically significant anymore. Newmark questioned the robustness 
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of their empirical findings, and when he changed their model specifications, their 
results were no longer statistically significant.  
 
Swedish findings have also been questioned. Wibe (2002) redid the empirical testing 
originally made by Sandström, Bergström et al. (2002). Wibe criticized them for 
choosing variables, not based on relevance for adding a positive effect on the results. 
Including other variables or excluding a few of the existing ones would change their 
findings, and even prove the opposite, independent schools have a negative impact on 
their tests. He also accuses them of using a dataset that does not represent all the 
schools  
 
In conclusion, it has been difficult to draw any unanimous analysis from previous 
research. It is a field where the theories of competition predict different outcomes. 
Therefore, it is of importance to perform an empirical research on the consequences 
of quality after introducing the school reform for upper secondary school in Sweden.   
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4. Data and methodology  
 
To empirically test the hypothesis, a quantitative, econometric, cross sectional method 
has been used. In a number of different regressions, average GPA has been used as a 
dependent variable. Measuring academic achievement is considered to be rather 
difficult and, in this paper, average GPA is used, assumed to reflect and indicate to 
some extent the knowledge of students in schools. Even though it is not a perfect 
measurement, there are other parameters besides knowledge that are considered when 
grades are given; it is the best existing measurement. Relative grades on a municipal 
level will also be used as a dependent variable to investigate if there is a gap in grades 
between public and independent schools depending on competition. As an 
independent variable, the share of students attending independent schools in a 
municipality will be used. The model is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
and by an IV-model (instrumental variable estimation), and checked for robustness. 
Data is collected from three different databases, SIRIS (NAE), Statistics Sweden and 
SKL. 
 
Cross sectional regressions have been chosen for a number of reasons. First of all, the 
requirements for students might change over time, as the school plan is revised. 
Second, grades are not an absolute measurement; at several time periods there has 
been a different grading system, and to weight old grades to new would be a 
complicated process. There is also a risk that grade inflation may affect the results if a 
longitudinal regression would be used. Finally, to collect data on all schools 
separately, year after year would be time consuming and not within the limited time 
of this paper. Thus, averaged GPA grades from 2010 will be used.  
 
To approach the problem with endogeneity, an estimation of the share of students 
attending independent schools was done. There will be a similar approach as Dee 
(1998) used with an instrumental variable model.   
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4.1 Dependent Variable 	  
The hypothesis of this project is that competition from independent schools on the 
Swedish school market, will affect the grades of students in public upper secondary 
schools, in the way that it enhances students grades. To test this can be difficult since 
it requires both information on students GPA and an objective assessment of the 
students. Since there is no satisfying, centralised control of knowledge in Sweden, a 
situation has arisen where there is a lack of data and good measurement for 
knowledge. In compulsory secondary school, students perform a national test in the 
three core subjects: math, Swedish and English. The results are collected by the 
Swedish National Agency for Education and can be used for analysis by researchers 
and authorities. In upper secondary school, on the other hand, similar tests are 
performed but it is only a sample of all the tests that is collected. Another weakness is 
that it is the teachers in the same school that are correcting the national test and that 
could cause a problem with objectivity (Vlachos 2010). It has been shown that 
average independent schools give higher grades on the national test than public 
schools, especially when it is the students own teachers correcting the tests 
(Skolverket 2009; Tyrefors-Hinnerich and Vlachos 2012).  What is suggested is that 
the national test should be corrected by a centralized organization and not by the 
school. This was tested in 2009, and they found a deviant result from the original 
corrections made by the schools (Skolinspektionen 2010:2). Several schools have 
used their own interpretation of the national criteria when it comes to setting grades, 
and they do not correspond to the criteria (Skolinspektionen 2010:1). Skolverket 
(2009) published a report, where they requested an additional measurement to 
simplify the analysis and to be able to draw more precise conclusions between actual 
knowledge and the grades students are given. Today, no such thing exists.  This is one 
of the major limitations when studying knowledge on an upper secondary school-
level.  
 
To perform a research question like this, a measurement that is based on a national-
wide test that is corrected by a centralized group of people and with a clear criteria of 
what is demanded, would be the best. No such data exists. Therefore, the 
measurement available today that can give us an idea of knowledge-level among 
students is average GPA, even though it is far from perfect.  
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4.2 Independent variable  
 
The share of students attending independent schools will be the key-explanatory 
variable in this report as a measurement for competition. However, just like 
knowledge and academic achievements, it can be problematic to measure competition 
for several reasons. In this paper I will treat every municipality as its own school 
market and competition will only be measured within that market. It seems to be a 
logic reasoning, since it is the local authorities that are financially responsible for 
schools. To continue, another assumption is that competition only exists between 
public schools and independent schools, hence higher rates of independent schools 
lead to higher competition and there is no competition between public schools. There 
could also be students choosing a school from a neighbouring area, and that 
competition is created between schools from different municipalities. Control 
variables will be used to try to counter these effects.  
 
Regardless of competition, there are other factors within a municipality that can affect 
level of grades in a municipality. Not least the characteristics of the population. 
Therefore, information about student background is of interest, such as the amount of 
students with foreign backgrounds, the share of female students in a school, and the 
average income in a municipality. This information will be considered as control 
variables.  
4.3 Control Variables 	  
It has been proven that parental support, attention and attitude towards schoolwork 
matters for academic achievement. Skolverket (1999) found a strong, positive 
correlation between students average GPA and the level of education of their parents. 
In this project, parental educational level will be used as a percentage of the students 
who have parents that continued to study after upper secondary school. The parent 
needs at least 30 credits from university or similar.   
 
The share of the students that are female will also be used. It has been shown that 
females tend to have on average higher GPA than males and that will be controlled 
for. The last variable on school level that will be used is the percentage of students 
with an immigrant background. In this case, that means that the student was born 
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abroad or that both of the student’s parents come from another country. Skolverket 
found that students with immigrant backgrounds perform worse in school, even when 
they took social background and gender into account.  
4.4 Data set 
 
My empirical analysis will contain two different sets of data, first, data on public and 
independent schools, and second, data on municipalities. The data on schools has 
been collected from the database SIRIS, on the National Agency for Education 
webpage. It consists of average grades of students that went to public upper secondary 
schools.  Students are selected from science and social science programmes in upper 
secondary schools. These are the two programmes that are most similar between 
schools and are therefore simplest to compare. How independent schools are closer to 
offer what students demand or how satisfied students are with their school will not be 
a part of this paper, but could still be a significant reason of the existence of 
independent schools.   
 
I started out by collecting data from the fifty largest municipalities in Sweden, to get 
an even spread sample over the entire country. Unfortunately, there is missing data on 
some municipalities, which leaves me with a sample of totally 46 municipalities.  
When comparing students from social science programmes, 93 public schools are 
included and in the science programme, I worked with 78 schools. 
 
To collect data on municipality level, Statistics Sweden and SKL has been used.  
 
4.5 Estimation Equation  
 
Traditional statistical method to be used in these situations is ordinary least square-
method (OLS), where average GPA or the relative grades is the dependent variable 
and share of students attending independent schools is the explanatory model. The 
main equation will look as follows:  
 
 !! =   !!!! +   !!!! +   !! 
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where: 
• !! is a measure of knowledge  
• F is the share of students attending independent schools, 
• !! is a parameter to be estimated,  
• !! is a vector of other explanatory variables on school level, 
•  !! is a parameter to be estimated 
• !! is an error term 
 
To run this equation and achieve correct, unbiased estimates requires that the error 
term is uncorrelated with the share of students in independent schools. This means 
that F is considered to be an exogenous variable, and that the causal relation goes 
from share of students to average GPA’s. 
 
It is not always the case to find a clear causal relation, if it is the other way around, 
the average GPA’s that affect the share of students in independent schools, then F can 
be considered to be an endogenous variable. A variable that is determined by the 
model itself, and therefore might give incorrect estimations of the variables (Angrist, 
Krueger et al. 2001). As mentioned earlier, an independent school will receive 
financial funding per student, based on the average cost per student in a municipality. 
Except for that funding, independent schools are not allowed to charge any tuition 
fees from their students. This means that independent schools do not have any impact 
on the amount of funding they will get per student. What they can control, to some 
extent, is their costs; by operating their school more efficiently and by attracting 
higher ability students, who need fewer resources. In municipalities with socially 
disadvantaged students or students with limited knowledge of Swedish could result in 
additional costs for the school. To make profits, independent schools could make the 
decision to not enter the school market in municipalities where the cost is higher. In 
other words, grades in a municipality might signal the level of the students. Thus, the 
key explanatory variable in my main equation can be a function of the dependent 
variable, academic achievements. There is a risk that this model suffers from 
endogeneity; therefore, a model will also be estimated with instrumental variables that 
will try to solve the potential endogeneity problem.  
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4.6 Instrumental variable 
 
To estimate the causal relationship between the share of students attending 
independent schools and the average grades and to deal with the endogeneity 
problem, the method of instrumental variables (IV) will be used. What needs to be 
solved is to find different variables that are correlated with the share of students 
attending independent schools, but at the same time are not correlated with the 
average GPA.  
 
My approach of dealing with this problem is similar to what Dee (1998) and Sander 
(1999) did. First of all, I created an equation that will explain the share of students in 
independent schools: 
 !! =   !"! +   !! 
where: 
• !! is the share of students in independent schools living in municipality j 
•  ! is a vector of explanatory variables 
• ! is a parameter to be estimated  
• !! is an error term  
 
Several factors that will be used as control variables in equation 1 will also appear in 
equation 2 but not all of them.  
 
To estimate the instruments for the share of independent schools, a wide range of 
different methods have been used. Most likely the instruments will vary depending on 
how the school market looks like in a country. Dee (1998) used religious variables as 
instruments for explaining the share of independent schools, a logic reasoning since 
the major part of independent schools in the United States of America is connected to 
religion. Unlike the US, Swedish independent schools have nothing to do with 
religion. As Sandström, Bergström et al. (2002) point out, Sweden is a particularly 
homogenous country where around 85 per cent are members of the Lutheran Church 
of Sweden.  
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My approach to estimate the share of independent schools builds on municipalities’ 
attitude towards them, both with a political perspective and by countering the 
characteristics of the population in a municipality. As I have mentioned, there are 
informal ways for a municipality to hinder the establishment of independent schools, 
which is why it is included. I have used a dummy variable if there is a conservative 
majority in the municipality to estimate the attitude toward independent schools. That 
is, the equation is built on the assumption that right-wing voters have a more positive 
view of privatization and that affects the introduction of independent schools. 
   
Besides the municipality, the market needs to be large enough to make profits. 
Therefore, I have used a dummy variable if the municipality is situated in a major 
urban area. The hypothesis is that with a school district in a major urban area, there 
are greater possibilities for starting a competitive business.  
 
 
  
Kaj Landelius (2012), “Does School Competition Improve Quality of Education”, Lund University   
	   27	  
5. Results  	  
 
Below, the descriptive statistics are seen for all the variables used in the regressions, 
both on a school level and for municipalities. The statistics on a school level are 
divided between social science and science programmes. 
 
To clarify, I will explain the abbreviations again: 
NOS- number of students 
SOF- share of females  
SOI- share of immigrants  
SEP- share of educated parents  
AVE. GPA- average GPA (grade point average) 
IND SCH- share of students attending independent school 
POP- population in a municipality 
AI- average income 
MA- metropolitan area 
CONS- conservative majority 
EDUP- share of educated parents  
 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 	  
The first table shows different variables on the school level. Every public upper 
secondary school that offers social science from the 46 largest municipalities is 
included. Data is collected from the database SIRIS on the NAE’s webpage. These 
variables will later be used as control variables in the different regressions performed. 
The statistics are counted for all the students attending a specific program, such as 
social science, in a school that year, except for the average GPA, which only includes 
the students graduating that year.  
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Table 1. Variables on school level, social science program, year 2010  
Var N Mean Median Std Min Max 
 
NOS 93 302,26 294 162,45 33 798 
 
SOF 93 61,39 63 9,24 35 88 
 
SOI 93 26,22 21 20,06 4 95 
 
EDUP 93 57,82 59 14,00 23 88 
 
AVE. 
GPA 93 14,67 14,7 1,19 12,40 17,8 
 
IND SCH 93 0,33 0,37 0,22 0 0,69 
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database and Statistics Sweden  
 
 
As seen in Table 1, there are large variations in all the variables. There is a substantial 
variation in the percentage of independent schools in different school districts. The 
share of independent schools varies between 0 and 69 percent, with a mean value of 
33 percent. The dependent variable, Average GPA, varies between 12.40 and 17.80, 
with a standard deviation of 1,19 credit points. As further seen in Table 1, there are 
also rather large variations in the different control variables used. For descriptive 
statistics on the different variables separated per school and region, see appendix.   
 
In table 2, the same variables are observed, but now collected on schools offering 
science program.    
   
Table 2. Variables on school level, science program, year 2010 
Var N Mean Median Std Min Max 
 
NOS 79 229,77 188 126,44 64 527 
 
SOF 79 44,90 45 8,94 16 61 
 
SOI 79 29,54 25 18,98 5 95 
 
EDUP 79 72,75 72 10,31 39 94 
 
AVE. GPA 79 16,03 16,1 1,03 13,4 17,8 
 
IND SCH 79 0,24 0,21 0,20 0 0,75 
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database and Statistics Sweden 
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As seen in Table 2, a similar result is shown as in Table 1. Worth mentioning is that 
there are not as many public schools with science programmes as with social science 
programmes. There is a larger gap in the share of students attending independent 
schools, where it varies between 0 and 75 percent. Average GPA, that later will be 
used as a dependent variable, varies between 13,4 and 17,8. On average, parents of 
students attending science programmes are more educated than parents to students 
attending social science programmes. At the same time, there are more girls attending 
social science compared to science, which is more male dominated.   
 
In table 3, the focus is now on descriptive statistics on the 46 largest municipalities. 
Parts of this information will be used as instrumental variables, in order to explain 
why some municipalities have a higher rate of independent schools than others, in the 
two-stage least square regression.    
 
Table 3. Variables on municipality level, year 2010  
Var N Mean Median Std. Dev Min Max 
 
POP 46 115434,30 81820 137537,66 42542 864324 
 
SOI 46 0,20 0,18 0,10 0,06 0,53 
 
AI 46 272,45 261,75 37,27 227,9 430,1 
 
MA 46 0,28 0 0,46 0 1 
 
CONS M 46 0,33 0 0,47 0 1 
 
EDUP 46 0,47 0,46 0,10 0,33 0,81 
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database, Statistics Sweden, and SKL 
(Sveriges kommuner och landsting)  
 
As seen in table 3, there are descriptive statistics of the municipalities where some of 
them are used for creating an instrumental variable model. There are also relatively 
large variations in the variables. There is a large variation in size between the 
municipalities, where Stockholm is the largest with 860 000 and Trelleborg is the 
smallest with 42 542. There is a dummy variable measuring political affiliation in this 
table, which takes the value of one if the municipality has a conservative majority. 
There is a dummy variable for a municipality that is included in a metropolitan area, 
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according to SKL. In major urban areas, it is more likely that students compete for the 
spots in a school because of the population density of students.  
 
There is a rather large difference in average cost per student between districts. How 
this would affect the likelihood of the existence of independent schools is unclear. On 
the one hand, it could increase the amount of independent schools since the school 
voucher is based on the average cost per student in a municipality. On the other hand, 
that could imply that there are extra costs or more expensive students that would deter 
independent schools.      
 
In table 4, a pairwise correlation matrix shows the correlation between the variables.  	  
Table 4. Correlations 
  GPA Ind. sch NOS SOF SOI EDUP POP 
  
       Ind.Sch 0,027 
        93 
       
NOS 0,299** 0,069 
       93 93 
      
SOF 0,183 -0,089 -0,118 
      93 93 93 
     
SOI -,413** ,204* -,369** -0,098 
     93 93 93 93 
    
EDUP ,579** 0,077 ,509** 0,054 -,744** 
    93 93 93 93 93 
   
POP 0,153 ,622** 0,175 -0,175 ,220* 0,126 
   93 93 93 93 93 93 
  
MA 0,004 ,233* 0,091 -,299** ,355** -0,019 ,592** 
  93 93 93 93 93 93 93 
 
** Correlation is significant at 
the 0.01 level. 
     * Correlation is significant at 
the 0.05 level. 
     Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database, Statistics Sweden, and SKL 
(Sveriges kommuner och landsting) 
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As seen in Table 4, the average GPA is positively correlated with the number of 
students at a school, the share of highly educated parents, and negatively correlated 
with the amount of immigrants. It follows with what previous research has found. The 
first assessment of the data set suggests that schools with a large amount of students, a 
high ratio of academic parents and a low share of immigrants will generate the highest 
grades. Observing the share of independent school in a municipality, it shows that 
there is no significant correlation with average GPA. Thus, the first analysis of the 
data seems to not support the findings that previous researchers found: that 
independent schools have a positive effect on knowledge among students.  
 
To ensure that the variables are legitimate, different statistical tests have been run. 
First, the variables were tested for multicollinearity. The variance inflation factor test 
did not show any indications of multicollinearity in either the OLS or the IV-model. 
After testing for skewness and kurtosis, I can conclude that the data is bell-shaped and 
I cannot reject the null hypothesis of normal distribution for the average GPA. When 
observing the data and its residuals, for heteroscedasticity, I cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity either.  
 
5.2 OLS-Model 
 
The first model is an OLS multiple regression on school level data, where average 
GPA of a school is the dependent variable, the share of students attending 
independent schools is the explanatory variable, and school characteristics as a vector 
of control variables that also might affect the grades. The results are shown below.   
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Table 5. OLS-regression. Dependent variable: Average GPA, Social science 
Var B Std. Error Sig. 
 
(Constant) 10,271 1,082 0 
 
IND. SCH -0,125 0,507 0,806 
 
NOS 0 0,001 0,709 
 
SOF 0,021 0,011 0,073 
 
SOI 0,004 8,00E-03 0,607 
 
EDUP 0,052 0,012 0 
 
R square 0,361     
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database, Statistics Sweden, and SKL 
(Sveriges kommuner och landsting) 
 
As seen in table 5, in the OLS regression, it is indicated that two specific variables are 
statistically significant determinants of the average GPA. Those are the share of 
female students attending the school and the share of educated parents. This suggests 
that a higher share of girls in a school will generate a higher GPA. It also shows that if 
there are higher shares of the students with parents who have studied at least one year 
at university, it will generate a higher GPA. Regarding the share of independent 
schools, it has, according to this method, a negative relation to the average GPA. 
Important to notice is that this finding is not significant and therefore it is impossible 
to either reject or accept the hypothesis. Thus, so far it is not proven that competition 
improves the grades or quality of public schooling, The R square value shows that 38 
percent of the average GPA is explained by this model.  
 
Similarly, the OLS multiple regression is made in table 6 as in table 5, but in this 
case, data from students in the science programme is used instead. 
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Table 6. OLS-regression. Dependent variable: Average GPA, Science 
Var B Std. Error Sig. 
 
(Constant) 11,542 1,083 0 
 
IND. SCH -0,005 0,416 0,991 
 
NOS 0,001 0,001 0,201 
 
SOF 0,021 0,009 0,018 
 
SOI -0,014 0,006 0,025 
 
EDUP 0,051 0,013 0 
 
R Square 0,594     
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database, Statistics Sweden, and SKL 
(Sveriges kommuner och landsting) 
 
As seen in table 6, there is one more significant variable in comparison to table 5, and 
that is the share of immigrants. This variable shows a negative relation to the average 
GPA. The share of independent schools has changed signs compared to table 5, which 
would suggest that increased competition would improve the quality of public 
schools. However, no conclusions can be drawn from this, since the variable is still 
not statistically significant.  
 
The regression results from these two models found that the share of female students 
attending a school has a significant, positive impact on grades. In the same way, 
schools with highly educated parents also have a positive impact on the school. 
Whether the share of immigrants has an influence on the grades differed in its 
significance in the two models. In the science programme, it is statistically proven to 
lower the average GPA. However, the most important finding in this model is that the 
share of students attending independent schools has no significant impact on the 
quality of public school.         
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5.3 IV-Model  
 
5.3.1 Estimation of instrumental variable  
 
In this step, the Instrumental Variable-model has been used to study what impact 
different variables have had on the share of students that enrol in independent schools 
on a municipality level. In the regression, the dependent variable is the share of 
students in independent schools. The explaining variables are the share of immigrants, 
average income in a municipality, and the share of the population with higher 
education. Two dummy variables are used: one if the municipality belongs to a 
metropolitan area and the other if there is a conservative majority in the municipality. 
These are the variables that are used as instrumental predictors for the share of 
students attending independent schools in a later stage.    
 
Table 7. IV-estimation. Estimation of the instrument variables for municipalities. 
Dependent variable: Share of students in independent schools, social science 
program 
Var B Std. Error Sig. 
 
(Constant) 0,59 0,271 0,032 
 
SIM -0,052 0,337 0,878 
 
AI -0,003 0,001 0,009 
 
EDUP 0,009 0,003 0,004 
 
MA 0,181 0,08 0,025 
 
CONS -0,029 0,051 0,572 
 
R square  0,177     
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database, Statistics Sweden, and SKL 
(Sveriges kommuner och landsting) 
 
The variables in table 7 explain 18 percent of the share of the students attending 
independent schools. There are three different variables that are statistically 
significant: average income, the education level of the population and if the 
municipality is in a metropolitan area. Educational level and metropolitan area both 
have a positive coefficient, while average income has a small, negative coefficient. 
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This indicates that people with higher education have a positive effect on the share of 
students attending independent schools. Whether the municipality is situated in a 
metropolitan area will also increase the number of students attending independent 
schools. This is not surprising since independent schools are common in metropolitan 
areas, and the more densely people are living, ceteris paribus, competition will 
increase. To avoid multicollinearity, other measurements such as population and 
population per square kilometre are excluded. However, if the municipality has a 
conservative majority seems to not have a significant effect on the share of students 
attending independent schools. Hence, it seems that it does not matter if it is a right-
wing or a left-wing municipality when it comes to the share of students attending 
independent schools on an upper secondary school level. The reasoning behind 
including the share of immigrants in a municipality was that a high share would imply 
a more diverse population and a larger demand for independent schools that would 
fulfil the population’s needs. The results show that there is not a statistically 
significant connection.      
 
Since the assumption is made that upper secondary schools only compete for students 
enrolling in specific programmes, there is a difference in the amount of students that 
attend social science programmes in independent schools compared to students 
attending science programmes. Therefore, two different tables are presented. Below, 
in table 8, the instrument variables are estimated but with the share of students in 
independent schools enrolling in science programmes as a dependent variable.  
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Table 8. IV-Estimation. Estimation of the instrument variables for municipalities 
Dependent variable: Share of students in independent schools 
Var B Std. Error Sig. 
 
(Constant) 0,277 0,304 0,365 
 
SOI 0,174 0,35 0,622 
 
AI -0,001 0,001 0,188 
 
EDUP 0,005 0,003 0,071 
 
MA 0,111 0,081 0,171 
 
CONS 0,016 0,055 0,775 
 
R square 0,138     
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database, Statistics Sweden, and SKL 
(Sveriges kommuner och landsting)  
 
As seen in table 8, two coefficients have changed from a negative sign to a positive in 
comparison to table 7, the variable for share of immigrants in a municipality and the 
dummy variable for conservative majority, but none of these variables are statistically 
significant. In general, the result in table 8 is weaker than in the previous table. In this 
table, it is only the level of education that is statistically significant. A higher 
educational level in a municipality will increase the share of students attending an 
independent school.  It is also a slightly lower R square value in this model.  
 
5.3.2 Instrumental variable regression 
 
In this section, estimation has been performed to measure the impact the share of 
independent schools has on the average GPA. To solve for the endogeneity problem, a 
two-stage least square regression has been used where municipality variables such as: 
share of immigrants, average income, level of education, if it is in a metropolitan area 
and if there is a conservative majority have been used to predict the share of 
independent schools 
  
Kaj Landelius (2012), “Does School Competition Improve Quality of Education”, Lund University   
	   37	  
Table 9. IV-Regression Estimation with the IV-model. Average GPA from social 
science programs is used as a dependent variable 
Var B Std. Error Sig. 
 
(Constant) 12,166 3,855 0,002 
 
IND.SCH -1,695 1,832 0,357 
 
SOF -0,011 0,045 0,807 
 
SOI 0,011 0,017 0,504 
 
EDUP 0,06 0,026 0,022 
 
R square 0,139     
 
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database, Statistics Sweden, and SKL 
(Sveriges kommuner och landsting)  
 
As seen in table 9, there is only one significant variable: the share of highly educated 
parents. It has a positive coefficient, which means that a higher share of educated 
parents will also increase the average GPA. The other variables are all insignificant 
and any conclusions about whether competition on the school market has increased 
the grades cannot be significantly drawn.  
 
Table 10. IV-Regression Estimation with the IV-model: Average GPA from 
science programs is used as a dependent variable 
Var B Std. Error Sig. 
 
(Constant) 17,844 9,208 0,056 
 
IND. SCH 0,013 4,494 0,998 
 
SOF -0,044 0,093 0,635 
 
SOI -0,033 0,046 0,471 
 
EDUP 0,016 0,068 0,817 
 
R square 0,207     
 
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database, Statistics Sweden, and SKL 
(Sveriges kommuner och landsting)  
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The same regression is made, but with students attending science program. In this 
regression, the results are even more insignificant, and no variable can be statistically 
proven to affect the average GPA.  
 
As shown above, performing an IV-regression did not improve the results of 
estimating to what extent the share of students attending independent schools would 
improve the average GPA. At the same time, running a two-stage linear regression 
gave a weaker result on the determinants that were significant in the OLS-model. 
According to Ahlin (2003), endogeneity of an independent schools location is not a 
problem in the Swedish market. The result in this section could, therefore, be a case 
of weak instrumental variables. The existence of independent schools on an upper 
secondary level is so extensive that it seems to be a randomised selection in terms of 
where they are located. In total, only 7 municipalities out of 46 do not offer an 
alternative to public schools, and in some municipalities it is considered to be an 
overcrowded market (Kallin	  2008). Thus, it would be interesting to study the upper 
secondary school market, but there are difficulties to make a good estimate of 
variables that explain the supply of schools.          
 
5.4 Robustness 	  
Two additional tests have been performed to check the robustness of the results. Since 
the data used in this paper is only a selection of schools and municipalities, there is a 
risk that the findings may be challenged. To make sure that the results would hold, 
two robustness tests have been performed. In the first test, each school with social 
science program was eliminated in succession. The new estimation was then used in 
an OLS-model. The OLS-model was used because it showed the most significant 
results in the testing. The same explanatory variable and control variables were used 
and average GPA was used as the dependent variable. In the second test a similar 
method was used, but this time each municipality has been successively excluded.  
 
The tests proved that the share of students attending independent schools does not 
significantly affect the quality of public schools. The coefficient remained negative, 
but still statistically insignificant. As before, the only two variables with a significant 
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coefficient were the share of female students and the share of highly educated parents. 
The share of female students shifted between a 5 and 10 percent significance level 
and the share of highly educated parents remained at a constant 1 percent significance 
level. In appendix, a sample of the changes in the variables used in the robustness 
tests is shown.  	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6. Conclusion 	  	  
This paper has analysed the effects of competition on the school market and other 
control variables, on students average GPA. The hypothesis is that higher competition 
in the school market (higher share of students attending independent schools) would 
improve the quality of education in public schools. Competition would force public 
schools to put more effort into the level education they provide, so that they would 
continue to attract students. This was tested with the help of a number of multiple 
linear regression models, where average GPA was the dependent variable and the 
share of students attending independent schools in a municipality was the independent 
variable. This was also performed with an instrumental variable model, where the 
share of students attending an independent school was estimated, in an attempt to 
solve the endogeneity problem that might exist between the dependent and the 
independent variable. This paper contributes to the research in this field by being the 
first to investigate what impact the market mechanism has on student performance in 
upper secondary school. This is of interest because independent schools have a larger 
share of the school market in upper secondary school than in compulsory school.  
 
My results do not support the hypothesis that independent schools have improved the 
quality of public education on upper secondary school level, through competitive 
pressure. That is, that the results I have found, do not support previous findings in 
Sweden (Sandström, Bergström et al. 2002; Tegle 2010) that an increase of school 
competition in a school district have statistically a positive significant impact on 
students grades. On the other hand, like Sander (1999), my findings do not support 
that allowing independent schools on the school market will decrease the grades in 
public schools. There is a risk that more disadvantaged students could be left behind 
in schools that do not perform well enough competitively, and they will not take part 
in those peer group effects that might arouse in highly competitive schools (Ahlin 
2003; Hsieh and Urquiola 2003; Sund 2009). It could be that it takes a long time for 
the competition mechanism to affect the school market. It will most likely take years 
for successful school to expand and open up new school. At the same time, it takes 
time for unsuccessful schools to exit the market. Before changes will occur, the spill 
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over effects independent schools could have on public schools might strike us with its 
absence.  
 
Because of the lack of good, objective measurement to compare with, average GPA 
has been used as a dependent variable. In a better world, there would be more 
available measurements, so a more extensive comparison could be performed without 
suffering from subjectivity and aggregated data, and more precise conclusions could 
be drawn. One of the shortcomings might be that I only used aggregated data, which 
may have generated too general of conclusions. There could also be an improvement 
in the estimation strategy, which could give a different result. In the instrumental 
variable model, it was difficult to find good estimates to explain the existence of 
independent schools. As in the US, several researchers have used religion as a proxy 
for independent schools (Hoxby 1994; Dee 1998), and it has been a good  proxy. In 
Sweden, independent schools compete for the same students, so in general, no 
specific group such as religious affiliation, is attracted to a certain school, except if 
the school has a good reputation. Therefore, it is hard to predict which factors matters 
when independent schools start up.  
 
In conclusion, this study has shown that the share of students attending independent 
schools is not an important determinant of the quality in public schools. Thus, there is 
an insignificant difference between municipalities with high rate of competition and 
municipalities with low rate of competition. These results differ from previous 
research where competition had a positive effect on the quality in compulsory school 
(Sandström, Bergström et al. 2002; Tegle 2010).  
 
For future research it would be interesting to focus more on upper secondary school 
level, since the school reform has had a greater impact on that market in comparison 
to compulsory school. To do research that investigates the connection between 
competition and school quality more closely. Due to the lack of good data in this 
paper, using a more extensive data set with variables on individual level would be 
good to complement my findings. Also, if possible, using several different 
measurements for the quality of education, and using results from different tests may 
give more significant results.   
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Appendix  	  
Description of Data 	  
Table 11. Schools used in regressions, social science program 
School NOS SOF SOI EDUP Ave. GPA 
Blackebergs gymnasium 554 59 13 78 16,7 
Bromma gymnasium 536 35 12 68 12,8 
Brännkyrka gymnasium 274 71 54 41 13,5 
Farsta gymnasium 132 50 61 42 15,2 
Frans Schartaus gymnasium 507 54 43 55 14,5 
Kungsholmens gy/Sthlms Musikgy 345 66 24 83 17,1 
Kärrtorps gymnasium 339 47 15 73 16,6 
Norra Real 367 67 9 85 17,1 
Ross Tensta gymnasium 234 55 92 28 12,7 
Spånga gymnasium 74 55 35 43 14,3 
Södra Latins gymnasium 479 75 9 80 17,8 
Thorildsplans gymnasium 339 49 39 57 13,7 
Östra Reals gymnasium 568 60 16 75 16,1 
Burgårdens utbildningscentrum 40 70 85 30 12,4 
Hvitfeldtska gymnasiet 532 56 23 70 15,1 
Katrinelundsgymnasiet 264 45 46 48 12,9 
Polhemsgymnasiet 379 59 26 65 16,2 
Schillerska gymnasiet 418 65 21 68 15,3 
Heleneholms gymnasium 140 63 24 70 12,7 
Malmö Borgarskola 559 55 36 66 16 
Malmö Latinskola 318 67 70 39 13,7 
Pauligymnasium 113 71 65 48 12,4 
S:t Petri skola 369 73 16 73 15,5 
Bolandgymnasiet 70 76 14 66 15,7 
Celsiusskolan 347 41 27 52 14,9 
Fyrisskolan 529 58 24 59 14 
Katedralskolan 347 67 12 76 16,7 
Anders Ljungstedts gymnasium 111 56 30 45 13,8 
Folkungaskolan gymnasiet 567 66 17 67 14,6 
Katedralskolan 490 62 15 68 15,2 
Carlforsska gymnasiet 326 64 29 56 13,8 
Rudbeckianska gymnasiet 457 68 23 70 14,8 
Karolinska skolan 578 69 29 66 16,2 
Risbergska skolan 206 57 22 54 13,7 
Nicolaiskolan 134 57 38 48 14,2 
Olympiaskolan 88 74 17 59 14 
De Geergymnasiet 144 65 60 34 14,2 
Hagagymnasiet 116 70 21 49 16,2 
Kungsgårdsgymnasiet 94 71 30 43 14,9 
Erik Dahlbergsgymnasiet 275 52 21 59 13,5 
Per Brahegymnasiet 449 71 14 62 13,5 
Dragonskolan 129 57 11 71 15 
Östra Gymnasiet 114 55 17 68 12,9 
Gymnasieskolan Spyken 374 64 8 85 16,1 
Katedralskolan 440 55 15 81 17,1 
Polhemskolan 798 56 19 66 13,8 
Bäckängsgymnasiet 470 69 21 60 15,2 
Sven Eriksonsgymnasiet 222 53 24 53 13,7 
Huddingegymnasiet 165 68 53 35 14,9 
Östra gymnasiet 335 68 29 44 14,1 
Rekarnegymnasiet 318 64 32 57 14,9 
S:t Eskils gymnasium 115 72 23 54 15,7 
Sundsvalls Gymnasium 523 54 8 57 13,6 
Borgarskolan 277 68 10 56 14,4 
Vasaskolan 264 65 17 55 15,9 
Kaj Landelius (2012), “Does School Competition Improve Quality of Education”, Lund University   
	   46	  
Sannarpsgymnasiet 385 68 21 57 14,7 
Sturegymnasiet 216 88 14 63 14,9 
Nacka gymnasium 756 56 10 75 16,5 
Colin Leclairgymnasiet 122 39 86 23 13,5 
Sundstagymnasiet 383 58 11 66 14,3 
Tingvallagymnasiet 275 64 21 57 13,9 
S:t Botvids gymnasium 78 64 95 26 15,2 
Tullinge gymnasium 165 36 39 47 14,2 
Tumba gymnasium 137 71 61 36 12,6 
Katedralskolan 311 63 16 67 14,8 
Kungsmadskolan 33 61 55 39 14,8 
Christian 4:s Gymnasium 127 76 13 59 14,3 
Söderportgymnasiet 358 63 21 62 13,8 
Österänggymnasiet 94 69 18 64 13,7 
Fredrika Bremergy Erika 319 50 32 39 12,7 
Aranäsgymnasiet 355 68 5 64 14,3 
Elof Lindälvs gymnasium 354 54 4 56 14,4 
Luleå gymnasieskola 269 62 13 67 15,5 
Kaplanskolan 170 69 7 55 15,6 
SAM-gymnasiet 306 63 57 44 13,5 
Rudbecksskolan 561 66 13 69 15,1 
af Chapmangymnasiet 249 61 11 66 15,4 
Fässbergsgymnasiet 109 48 22 60 14 
Peder Skrivares skola 298 60 13 61 15,3 
Richard Steffengymnasiet 375 60 5 54 15,7 
Rodengymnasiet 260 58 10 48 15,3 
Lugnetgymnasiet 205 62 9 71 14 
Magnus Åbergsgymnasiet 263 69 30 49 14,2 
Nolaskolan 369 73 8 53 14,9 
Uddevalla gymnasieskola 441 64 14 60 14,7 
Nyköpings gymnasium 293 63 20 42 13,1 
Gymnasium Skövde Västerhöjd 294 68 21 58 14,9 
Linnéskolan 183 63 20 49 15,4 
Hagagymnasiet 217 56 20 40 13,3 
Gångsätra gymnasium 448 45 9 75 15 
Hersby gymnasium 210 57 9 88 16,5 
Tyresö gymnasium 165 50 19 63 14,4 
Söderslättsgymnasiet 205 65 22 45 14,5 
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database 	  
 
Table 12. Schools used in regressions, science program 
School NOS SOF SOI EDUP Ave. GPA 
Blackebergs gymnasium 473 36 19 84 17,5 
Bromma gymnasium 176 25 22 79 15,2 
Brännkyrka gymnasium 97 54 71 57 14,9 
Farsta gymnasium 77 39 43 70 15,4 
Kungsholmens gy/Sthlms Musikgy 341 61 35 87 17,7 
Kärrtorps gymnasium 370 44 29 80 16,6 
Norra Real 414 43 24 84 17,8 
Ross Tensta gymnasium 119 48 92 46 13,9 
SpÂnga gymnasium 181 53 25 71 15,1 
S:t Eriks gymnasium 152 54 78 57 13,8 
Södra Latins gymnasium 189 61 17 88 17,6 
Thorildsplans gymnasium 246 20 41 70 14,5 
Östra Reals gymnasium 362 43 45 70 16 
Hvitfeldtska gymnasiet 527 48 34 76 16,4 
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Katrinelundsgymnasiet 185 45 41 69 14,2 
Polhemsgymnasiet 430 47 29 75 17,4 
Heleneholms gymnasium 87 38 30 74 15,4 
Malmö Borgarskola 329 43 56 70 16,5 
Malmö Latinskola 109 46 67 49 13,6 
Pauligymnasium 143 43 68 54 13,9 
S:t Petri skola 412 50 35 77 16,1 
Celsiusskolan 104 42 24 80 15,4 
Fyrisskolan 243 35 29 72 15,3 
Katedralskolan 213 48 29 79 17,6 
Lundellska skolan 174 40 10 89 17,6 
Rosendalsgymnasiet 427 38 17 89 16,6 
Berzeliusskolan 354 38 21 81 16,2 
Katedralskolan 327 46 13 85 16,9 
Hässlö gymnasiet 104 16 14 70 16,5 
Rudbeckianska gymnasiet 443 44 33 74 16,1 
Karolinska skolan 497 57 38 67 15,8 
Risbergska skolan 79 58 19 72 15,7 
Filbornaskolan 89 37 22 72 15,7 
Olympiaskolan 67 42 25 78 16,9 
Tycho Braheskolan 64 50 33 67 14,8 
Ebersteinska gymnasiet 143 41 35 73 15,8 
Hagagymnasiet 95 41 28 66 16,6 
Erik Dahlbergsgymnasiet 340 41 22 77 16,5 
Per Brahegymnasiet 94 60 17 77 16,7 
Östra Gymnasiet 91 34 16 68 15,7 
Gymnasieskolan Spyken 360 54 7 94 17,6 
Katedralskolan 504 46 17 92 17,2 
Polhemskolan 360 43 22 80 15,8 
Bäckängsgymnasiet 268 49 25 69 16,8 
Huddingegymnasiet 143 45 65 56 15,7 
Sjödalsgymnasiet 188 40 33 72 15,8 
Östra gymnasiet 152 53 32 59 14 
Rinmangymnasiet 220 51 43 69 15,9 
Sundsvalls Gymnasium 133 55 16 70 15,2 
Vasaskolan 229 45 25 69 16,6 
Nacka gymnasium 415 43 15 82 17,7 
Naturvetargymnasiet 129 50 95 64 15,3 
Älvkullegymnasiet 295 43 19 80 14,9 
Tullinge gymnasium 151 25 19 77 15,5 
Tumba gymnasium 66 59 76 39 13,4 
Katedralskolan 320 48 23 74 16,2 
Österänggymnasiet 277 44 23 78 15,4 
Fredrika Bremergy Heurika 244 38 35 58 15,3 
Elof Lindälvs gymnasium 163 41 9 81 16,8 
Luleå gymnasieskola 268 52 9 80 16,8 
Balderskolan 197 51 12 69 16,2 
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NT-gymnasiet 262 34 40 77 16,7 
Rudbecksskolan 510 38 22 84 16,3 
Åva gymnasium 181 39 15 82 16,5 
Ehrensvärdska gymnasiet 203 50 10 79 16,7 
Fässbergsgymnasiet 146 40 31 80 16,5 
Peder Skrivares skola 168 50 15 65 16,1 
Christopher Polhemgymnasiet 219 47 5 71 16,9 
Haraldsbogymnasiet 171 48 14 80 16,9 
Nils Ericsonsgymnasiet 181 52 31 70 15,7 
Nolaskolan 161 59 17 68 17,2 
Uddevalla gymnasieskola 218 52 17 66 16 
Nyköpings gymnasium 126 44 19 67 16,1 
Gymnasium Skövde Västerhöjd 257 60 17 71 16,6 
Hässleholms Tekniska skola 151 50 28 63 16,5 
Soltorgsgymnasiet 147 44 26 64 16,2 
Hersby gymnasium 412 37 8 89 16,3 
Tyresö gymnasium 74 28 20 74 15,5 
Söderslättsgymnasiet 116 51 33 62 15,7 
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database 
 
 
Table 13. Municipalities used in regressions 
Municipality AI MA CONS EDUP SOI 
Stockholm 312,1 1 1 58 0,29 
Göteborg 261,3 1 0 47 0,3 
Malmö 227,9 1 0 46 0,41 
Uppsala 262,2 0 1 55 0,21 
Linköping 259,5 0 1 54 0,17 
Västerås 274,1 0 1 48 0,24 
Örebro 251,5 0 0 46 0,2 
Helsinborg 262,3 0 0 42 0,26 
Norrköping 248,7 0 0 40 0,2 
Jönköping 262,9 0 1 50 0,18 
Umeå 251,9 0 0 59 0,12 
Lund 259,4 0 0 69 0,21 
Borås 257,8 0 0 44 0,25 
Huddinge 288,8 1 0 45 0,34 
Eskilstuna 241,5 0 0 43 0,27 
Sundsvall 273,6 0 0 43 0,1 
Gävle 268,6 0 0 44 0,14 
Halmstad 257,1 0 0 50 0,19 
Nacka 365,1 1 1 64 0,23 
Södertälje 246,2 1 0 37 0,44 
Karlstad 253,3 0 0 54 0,13 
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Botkyrka 243,1 1 0 38 0,53 
Växjö 259,3 0 1 50 0,19 
Kristianstad 249,6 0 0 46 0,18 
Haninge 269,4 1 0 33 0,29 
Kungsbacka 326,6 1 1 54 0,08 
Luleå 265,4 0 0 55 0,11 
Skellefteå 262,6 0 0 46 0,07 
Järfälla 298,7 0 1 44 0,32 
Sollentuna 362,5 1 1 66 0,26 
Karlskrona 265,4 0 0 48 0,13 
Mölndal 301,5 1 0 49 0,18 
Varberg 268,6 0 1 49 0,11 
Gotland 236,1 0 0 39 0,06 
Norrtälje 260,7 0 1 34 0,12 
Falun 266,1 0 0 50 0,1 
Trollhättan 255,1 0 0 34 0,23 
Örnsköldsvik 269,4 0 0 44 0,07 
Uddevalla 256,5 0 0 41 0,15 
Nyköping 270,6 0 0 39 0,14 
Skövde 260,2 0 1 46 0,16 
Hässleholm 242,6 0 0 44 0,15 
Borlänge 252,7 0 0 37 0,17 
Lidingö 430,1 1 1 81 0,18 
Tyresö 321 1 1 43 0,19 
Trelleborg 253,2 0 0 36 0,18 
  
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from Statistics Sweden, and SKL (Sveriges kommuner och 
landsting) 
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Test of Robustness 
 
Table 14.  Sample of OLS-regression with one school excluded in succession 
IND. SCH NOS SOF SOI EDUP 
-0,168 0 0,021* 0,004 0,051*** 
-0,014 0 0,014 0,003 0,051*** 
-0,092 0 0,022* 0,004 0,051*** 
-0,178 0 0,023** 0,003 0,051*** 
-0,126 0 0,021* 0,004 0,052*** 
-0,141 0 0,02* 0,003 0,048*** 
-0,195 0 0,024** 0,004 0,05*** 
-0,163 0 0,02* 0,004 0,049*** 
-0,118 0 0,02* 0,005 0,052*** 
-0,173 0 0,021* 0,005 0,052*** 
-0,216 0 0,017 0,004 0,05*** 
-0,098 0 0,019* 0,005 0,052*** 
-0,149 0 0,02* 0,004 0,051*** 
-0,048 0 0,022** 0,006 0,052*** 
-0,118 0 0,02* 0,004 0,052*** 
-0,047 0 0,019* 0,004 0,051*** 
-0,225 0 0,021* 0,004 0,051*** 
-0,131 0 0,02* 0,004 0,052*** 
-0,059 0 0,02* 0,006 0,057*** 
-0,131 0 0,021* 0,003 0,051*** 
-0,122 0 0,021* 0,005 0,052*** 
-0,116 0 0,024** 0,008 0,055*** 
Note:All the variables are used as when the OLS-regression was performed. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5% and *** significant at 1% 
Source: Authors calculations, based on data from SIRIS database, Statistics Sweden, and SKL 
(Sveriges kommuner och landsting) 	  
